Transport Architectures for Very Resilient Internet (TAVRI)
The current Internet is strictly dependent from
the same protocol (BGP), largely deployed in millions of routers, yet
being extremely weak against a number of attacks, the most frequent and
dangerous ones being routing attacks. Additionally, the single way to
achieve a reliable interconnection at the Internet edges under BGP is to
intensively tweak its parameters, operations that undermine the overall
Internet resiliency and poses important scalability problems (huge
routing tables and routing instabilities).
The TAVRI project proposes a rather simple Internet routing
principle yet extremely revolutionary that can unblock the development
of advanced services in a secure and resilient future Internet. Our will
is to define a solution that is totally transparent to BGP while
allowing its partial replacement, especially at the transit core of the
Internet.
The framework is that of Transit-Edge
hierarchical routing, through which
we pass from a flat Internet routing to a 2-level hierarchical routing,
between edge networks from on hand and between transit network from the
other hand. Transit-Edge routing separation represents the key brick
toward a far more resilient and secure Internet, tackling the resiliency
and security aspects from the more essential direction that underfund
the Internet infrastructure: the routing principle. The idea is to apply
basic mailing principles to Internet routing: as a mailbox can
potentially leave the post network at many post offices, a packet can
reach the destination network passing through many routing locators; as
routing among post offices is much more resilient and fast than from the
post office to the destination address, the traffic can be better
aggregated and engineered in the Internet transit core. The TAVRI
project work towards the definition of resilient protocols and traffic
engineering solutions appropriate to this future context.